Drawing on the "one person, one vote" principle, this Court recognized that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by adilutionof voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot." Appellants are five residents of Dur-. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. The Court expressly declined to reach that question. of Oral Arg. Moreover, a group's power to affect the political process does not automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss. As was the case in New York, a number of North Carolina's political subdivisions have interfered with black citizens' meaningful exercise of the franchise and are therefore subject to 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act. JUSTICE O'CONNOR DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. Id., at 53-54. no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. Shaw. Post, at 668 (WHITE, J., dissenting). I have no doubt that a State's compliance with the Voting Rights Act clearly constitutes a compelling interest. cial harms that are not present in our vote-dilution cases. The General Assembly's first redistricting plan contained one majority-black district centered in that area of the State. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion); id., at 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment); see also UJO, 430 U. S., at 172 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("[A] purportedly preferential race assignment may in fact disguise a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of the plan's supposed beneficiaries"). Furthermore, how it intends to manage this standard, I do not know. As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a 12th seat in the United States House of Representatives. In our view, the District Court properly dismissed appellants' claims against the federal appellees. The Democratic National Committee maintained that the minority districts were constitutional, while the Republican National Committee argued that they were not. If not, it does not. One state legislator has remarked that" '[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district.'" of Ed., supra, at 282-283 (plurality opinion). The district even has inspired poetry: "Ask not for whom the line is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee." 92-357. Supp., at 472-473. JUSTICE SOUTER apparently views racial gerrymandering of the type presented here as a special category of "benign" racial discrimination that should be subject to relaxed judicial review. the purchase to her American Express card. 10 This appears to be what has occurred in this instance. The Court expresses no view on whether appellants successfully could have challenged a district such as that suggested by the Attorney General or whether their complaint stated a claim under other constitutional provisions. districts in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. Croson, supra, at 493 (plurality opinion); UJO, supra, at 173 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("[E]ven in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs"). Ante, at 652. In the 17th, 19th, and 20th Districts, whites constituted respectively 94.9%, 71.5%, and 72.5% of the population. This Court has held political gerrymanders to be justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. But a principal consequence of school segregation was inequality in educational opportunity provided, whereas use of race (or any other group characteristic) in districting does not, without more, deny equality of political participation. Alabama's exercise in geometry was but one example of the racial discrimination in voting that persisted in parts of this country nearly a century after ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. See App. Although I would leave this question for another day, I would note that even then courts have insisted on "some showing of injury to assure that the district court can impose a meaningful remedy." Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. -dividing voters into districts bc of race is segregation. At some points the district was no wider than Interstate 85, prompting one state legislator to remark that if "you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district." to Brief for Federal . Or can it maintain that change, while attempting to enhance minority voting power in some other manner? Under 5, the State remained free to seek a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia notwithstanding the Attorney General's objection. Since I do not agree that appellants alleged an equal protection violation and because the Court of Appeals faithfully followed the Court's prior cases, I dissent and would affirm the judgment below. The dissenters consider the circumstances of this case "functionally indistinguishable" from multimember districting and at-large voting systems, which are loosely described as "other varieties of gerrymandering." What I am saying is that in electoral districting there frequently are permissible uses of race, such as its use to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as well as impermissible ones. Id., at 342-348. Accordingly, we have asked that an identifiable group demonstrate more than mere lack of success at the polls to make out a successful gerrymandering claim. ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAYS OR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF [February 7, 2022] The application for a stay or injunctive relief presented to J. USTICE . 2. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 118-127. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 40-41 (1993) ("Unless these points are established, there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy"). As we have said, "it requires no special genius to recognize the political consequences of drawing a district line along one street rather than another." When a newly created district cannot be explained by means other than race, it is subject to strict scrutiny. We note, however, that only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469,494 (plurality opinion). You're all set! Id., at 59. Constitutional Principle. b. Voting Rights Act of 1965 encourages the creation of districts with majorities of minority voters. The facts of this case mirror those presented in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as a per se matter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. Cf. The state appellees assert that the deliberate creation of majority-minority districts is the most precise way-indeed the only effective way-to overcome the effects of racially polarized voting. We have indicated that similar preconditions apply in 2 challenges to single-member districts. Ibid. (emphasis added). Did the North Carolina residents who objected to the majority-minority district raise a valid question under the Fourteenth Amendment? But "[a] number of states refused to take no for an answer and continued to circumvent the fifteenth amendment's prohibition through the use of both subtle and blunt instruments, perpetuating ugly patterns of pervasive racial discrimination." 1 It has been argued that the required showing of discriminatory effect should be lessened once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates intentional discrimination. The Twelfth District received even harsher criticism. ); id., at 175-179 (Brennan, J., concurring in part); id., at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). Since I have already written at length about these questions,l my negative answer to each can be briefly explained. That claim was dismissed, see Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep,UJO. They did not even claim to be white. With him on the briefs were Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Senior, Deputy Attorney General, and Norma S. Harrell and Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorneys General. Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. Location North Carolina General Assembly. See, e. g., ante, at 639-641.4 A contrary conclusion could only be described as perverse. We also do not decide. "Being aware," in this context, is shorthand for "taking into account," and it hardly can be doubted that legislators routinely engage in the business of making electoral predictions based on group characteristics-racial, ethnic, and the like. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 277278 (1986) (plurality opinion); id., at 285 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 639-652. This question also need not be decided at this stage of the litigation. Draper reviewed the receivables list from the January transactions. In a similar vein, Justice Stewart was joined by Justice Powell in stating: "The petitioners have made no showing that a racial criterion was used as a basis for denying them their right to vote, in contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment. Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, 1. Enduring Legacy. The first involves direct and outright deprivation of the right to vote, for example by means of a poll tax or literacy test. 364 U. S., at 341. Wygant, supra, at 295 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). Moreover, redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors. See Reynolds, 377 U. S., at 578 (recognizing these as legitimate state interests). Clause" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 630-631 (1991) ("If our society is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury"). See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616-617 (1982); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). One of the lower court judges described it as winding in a snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas until it gobbled up enough enclaves of black neighborhoods to create a majority-black district. Naomi buys $1,000 worth of American Express travelers checks and charges (1) The Common Cause District Court concluded that all but one of the districts in North Carolina's 2016 Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally diluting the voting strength of Demo crats. They also point out that in 1990 a black candidate defeated a white opponent in the Democratic Party runoff for a United States Senate seat before being defeated narrowly by the Republican incumbent in the general election. The plaintiffs in UJO-members of a Hasidic community split between two districts under New York's revised redistricting plan-did not allege that the plan, on its face, was so highly irregular that it rationally could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters by race. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, WHITE, Marshall, and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)); 488 U. S., at 514-516 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (undertaking close examination of the characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged racial groups said to justify the disparate treatment although declining to articulate different standards of review); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Syllabus ; View Case ; Appellant Shaw . Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 755 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("One need not use Justice Stewart's classic definition of obscenity-'I know it when I see it' -as an ultimate standard for judging the constitutionality of a gerrymander to recognize that dramatically irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an explanation" (footnotes omitted)). Id., at 133 (emphasis added). Nor is it a particularly accurate description of what has occurred. Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a dramatic and severe response to the situation. By a 2-to-1 vote, the District Court also dismissed the complaint against the state appellees. Final Vote: 5-4. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979). 42 U. S. C. 1973c; see also 1973b(f)(2). Brief for Appellants 57. The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, surely, does not stand in the way. Though they might be dissatisfied at the prospect of casting a vote for a losing candidate-a lot shared by many, including a disproportionate number of minor-, its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing a poll tax [and] a literacy test. That argument strikes a powerful historical chord: It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past. See supra, at 647-649. T. HOMAS. At-large and multimember schemes, however, do not classify voters on the basis of race. Some 90 years later, Alabama redefined the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" in a manner that was alleged to exclude black voters, and only black voters, from the city limits. JUSTICE SOUTER contends that exacting scrutiny of racial gerrymanders under the Fourteenth Amendment is inappropriate because reapportionment "nearly always require[s] some consideration of race for legitimate reasons." What appellants object to is redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification. 808 F. Fast Facts: Shaw v. Reno Case Argued: April 20, 1993 Decision Issued: June 28, 1993 After the Attorney General of the United States objected to the plan pursuant to 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 506 U. S. 801 (1992). In districting, by contrast, the mere placement of an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right or benefit provided to others. It applied a three-part test, examining intent, effects, and causation. In the present case, the facts could sustain no such allegation. 653-657. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial distinctions, but also to those "rare" statutes that, although race-neutral, are, on their face, "unexplainable on grounds other than race." against anyone by denying equal access to the political process. own provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies where there is no indication that this segment of the population is being denied access to the political system." It is true, of course, that one's vote may be more or less effective depending on the interests of the other individuals who are in one's district, and our cases recognize the reality that members of the same race often have shared interests. The dissenters make two other arguments that cannot be reconciled with our precedents. We express no view as to whether appellants successfully could have challenged such a district under the Fourteenth Amendment. Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: ''When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. Pp. The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has nothing to do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups they affect, but whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting process at the expense of any minority group, and thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral power. When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. No analogous purpose or effect has been alleged in this case. In fact, our country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting-as well as our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which always has reserved the strictest scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of race, see supra, at 642-644-would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. See, e. g., Croson, 488 U. S., at 491-493 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, J. Finally, we must ask whether otherwise permissible redistricting to benefit an underrepresented minority group becomes impermissible when the minority group is defined by its race. In Beer, we held that a reapportionment plan that created one majorityminority district where none existed before passed muster under 5 because it improved the position of racial minorities. Our conclusion is supported by the plurality opinion in UJO, in which four Justices determined that New York's creation of additional majority-minority districts was constitutional because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the State "did more than the Attorney General was authorized to require it to do under the nonretrogression principle of Beer." United States Supreme Court. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 - which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization - North Carolina submitted to the Attorney General a congressional . Part of the explanation for the majority's approach has to do, perhaps, with the emotions stirred by words such as "segregation" and "political apartheid." Nonetheless, the notion that North Carolina's plan, under which whites remain a voting majority in a disproportionate number of congressional districts, and pursuant to which the State has sent its first black representatives since Reconstruction to the United States Congress, might have violated appellants' constitutional rights is both a fiction and a departure from settled equal protection principles. And those three Justices specifically concluded that race-based districting, as a response to racially polarized voting, is constitutionally permissible only when the State "employ[s] sound districting principles," and only when the affected racial group's "residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majority." The shape of the district at issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here. The District Court in Pope dismissed appellants' claim, reasoning in part that "plaintiffs do not allege, nor can they, that the state's redistricting plan has caused them to be 'shut out of the political process.''' Why did four justices in this case dissent from majority opinion? Instead, it is the State that must rebut the allegation that race was taken into account, a fact that, together with the legislators' consideration of ethnic, religious, and other group characteristics, I had thought we practically took for granted, see supra, at 660. A. Croson Co., supra, at 493; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 484 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C. That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks such power because it remains underrepresented in the state legislature - whether that group is defined by political affiliation, by common economic interests, or by religious, ethnic, or racial characteristics. As long as members of racial groups have the commonality of interest implicit in our ability to talk about concepts like <"minority voting strength," and "dilution of minority votes," cf.Thornburg v. Gingles(1986), and as long as racial bloc voting takes place, legislators will have to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting strength in the districting plans they adopt.